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List of Abbreviations

AIDS

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome

ALP

AIDS Law Project

ARV

Anti-retroviral

COSATU

Congress of South African Trade Unions

HIV

Human Immunodeficiency Virus

MSD

Merck Sharp and Dohme

MSF

Medicines Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders)

PMA

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association

PMTCT

Prevention of Mother-to-Child-Transmission

SANAC

South African National AIDS Council

SMO

Social Movement Organization

TAC

Treatment Action Campaign

TL

Treatment Literacy

TRC

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UN

United Nations

UNAIDS

Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
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INTRODUCTION
South Africa is known to have the largest HIV epidemic in the world with 5.7
million people currently living with HIV (UNAIDS). In view of the scope of the
HIV/AIDS crisis, South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) has led a broader
social movement to increase access to HIV/AIDS treatments. As a leading social
movement organization (SMO), TAC addresses the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa
through multiple means. Identifying the government as a key actor, TAC has fought for
health programs and policies, as well as adherence to the policies put in place. Next,
realizing the need for drug therapy TAC has targeted pharmaceutical companies to make
HIV treatment more accessible. Thirdly, recognizing the needs of various groups
impacted by the disease, TAC has implemented programs to address the needs of
especially vulnerable communities such as pregnant women with HIV, youth, and
immigrant and refugee populations.
Since the founding of the organization a decade ago, the Treatment Action
Campaign has been highly acclaimed within the country and sub-Saharan region as a
model organization within the HIV/AIDS social movement. TAC has been recognized
for the success it has achieved in 2003 as the recipient of the Nelson Mandela Award for
Health and Human Rights and prides itself as a 2004 Nobel Peace Prize nominee.
Now, I seek to investigate whether or not the Treatment Action Campaign is truly
successful. First I will define the parameters within which to measure success. I will
grapple with questions such as: what defines success and how can it be measured? By
what criteria can TAC’s performance be measured? What conditions are necessary to
achieve success?
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Moreover, given that TAC is a highly recognized and celebrated group, one might
wonder why TAC has not achieved more. Provided that TAC fits the criteria for
possessing the qualities of a potentially “successful” group, could it be discovered that it
has not achieved the success that is expected of this sort of organization? Through this
paper, I will set up a framework to measure TAC’s success and then use it to assess its
political and social/cultural outcomes. TAC’s political strategies are well-known and
seem to be successful at first glance. On the other hand, measuring social and cultural
outcome will be much more difficult due to the subjectivity of the matter.
Overall measuring the political outcome (i.e. the creation of treatment programs
and health policies) has been straightforward, but I have found that measuring the social
and cultural outcome of the social movement on HIV/AIDS is more complex. There is
much more ambiguity in the measurement of social and cultural outcomes.
Nevertheless, I will attempt to determine whether or not TAC has met its potential and if
TAC is truly a successful social movement organization.

LITERATURE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT SUCCESS
The Treatment Action Campaign of South Africa is well known in the subSaharan region and highly acclaimed for its efforts to thwart progression of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is my aim to examine TAC within the social movement discourse
in order to determine its success. Many scholars have theorized about what is necessary
for a social movement to thrive given the political and social climate. Scholars often
examine collective action through theories such as the political process theory and
resource mobilization theory, distinguishing what is necessary in order for a social

5

movement to generate successful collective action. Within the discussion of the evolution
of social movements, there is an ongoing debate as to how to measure success. The
dialogue of what constitutes success and what measures are appropriate for determining
success has yet to come to conclusion. The units of analysis explored by social movement
scholars vary. Some scholars focus on political impacts while others examine cultural or
social impacts of the social movement. There is disagreement over which indicators
should be considered in order to determine social movement success and a gamut of
possibilities has been explored.
The emergence of collective behavior gave rise to theories which guide social
movement research such as the political process model. Scholars of political process
theory present the case that mobilization takes place in the wake of specific political
opportunities, placing emphasis on the external political environment being conducive to
the movement’s goals and initiatives (Bernstein 2003, 358). According to the political
process model, movements are likely to develop and emerge during times of favorable
external political conditions which present opportunities to groups in weak social
positions the incentive to be potential challengers (Morris 2000, 446). Morris (2000)
claims that in order for groups to engage in successful collective action, they must be
exposed to an external political opportunity which is advantageous for the challenging
group.
Another social movement theory stresses the aggregation of resources, which
includes but is not limited to resources such as money and labor. This approach, known
as resource mobilization theory, is at the core of Giugni’s (2004) study of organizational
variables and success of social movements. Resource mobilization theory places social
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organization as a precondition for collective action, while also emphasizing the ability to
mobilize appropriate resources for collective action to take place. Giugni follows the
central argument of Gamson in Strategy of Social Protest, referring to Gamson’s work as
the most systematic inquiry of social movement impact and effectiveness. Gamson
(1990) examined the trends and tactics of social movements that achieved success. His
study of social movement theory included organizational structure, external crises, and
the movement’s use of violence and then finally correlated these features with the
movement’s overall success.
Another scholar on resource mobilization theory, Jenkins (1983) expands on
social movement theory, adding that resources can be accumulated in not only tangible,
but also intangible forms. Tangible resources are those such as money, facilities, and
means of communication, whereas intangible resources are those of “human” assets such
as organizing and legal skills of participants, and unspecialized labor from supporters
(Jenkins 1983, 533). Both sets of resources are vital to operating towards a movement’s
goals.
Furthermore, Jenkins explains that resource mobilization theorists view social
movements as extensions of institutionalized actions. These theorists argue that social
movements can attempt to influence the elements of social structure and organize groups
that have previously been unorganized against the institutional elite for example, through
legal reform. As a result, social movements must carry out clearly defined, rational
actions in order to pursue their specified interests and fixed goals.
These theories, while looking at the conditions in which social movements arise,
hint at the ways in which success of social movements can be determined. Each theory,
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examining the political backdrop or the ability to mobilize resources, shows what
elements may be necessary to achieve success. Scholars have utilized these theories in
order to identify indicators of social movement success. Some have targeted political and
legislative outcomes as the key indicators of success while others argue that consideration
of social and cultural outcomes are also relevant. These are primarily external indicators
of success, meaning that the results occur within the external targeted group such as the
institutional elite or specific governmental policies.
Meanwhile, other scholars examine internal indicators of success, which are the
internal results and benefits that are experienced by the participants of the social
movement. Internal factors themselves may play a significant role in affecting the
mobilization potential of the movement.
Scholars Tilly and Tarrow (2007) look at three other effects of social movements,
examining both external and internal impacts. First, they examine the direct external
impact of social movement campaigns on public policies. Second, they examine the
internal impact on the lives of activists by observing the effects of participation in claimmaking campaigns. And thirdly, they examine the effect of outside campaigns on the
social movement itself. Their work primarily involves campaigns that organize public
efforts to make collective claims on those in authority. This approach incorporates
external as well as internal impacts of a social movement’s actions while also considering
the effects of involvement within the social movement as a whole.
Giugni (2004) also examines the external impact on public policy, although he
stresses the importance of internal variables and resource mobilization as contributing
factors in the determination of the group’s success. Following Gamson’s foundational
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work, Giugni (2004) proposes the following areas of movement success: policy change,
change in policy process, and changes in social values. Giugni’s determination of success
is dependent upon changes seen externally rather than internally within the social
movement.
Providing another alternative, Brown (2005) turns to a different set of categories
to assess movement impact and success. Brown measures the success of social movement
organizations through the assessment of what he calls “outcome success”, “legislative
success,” and “perceived success”. The first measure, outcome success, requires
examination of the collective benefits and actual changes for the members of the group.
Brown argues that this is the ultimate measure of success. Outcome success, as described
by Brown, depends on the combination of the context in which the organization works
and the specific demands and tactics implemented by the group in order to achieve their
goals. Other variables can also influence the attainment of outcome success, such as the
influence of the national government, public opinion, and policy changes.
Next on Brown’s set of categories is legislative or policy success, which is
“typically measured in terms of policy gains through changes in laws and allocation of
money” (Brown 2005, 12). Political change, an external impact, is often cited by various
social movement scholars as previously noted. In the same vein, Brown explains
legislative success as the changes seen within the government’s legislative body through
which the social movement’s goals are realized. The implementation of policy change or
new programs does not guarantee that the group’s goals will be realized. But Brown sees
legislative change as “benchmarks on the road to real change” (2005, 11).
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And lastly, perceived success is the internal perception of success. This means
that the organization and its leaders determine the extent to which they believe they have
been successful. This measure is very subjective and depends on the goals and
expectations the group has of itself. This measure of success will be heavily reliant upon
internal operations of the group, which can greatly influence the group’s ability to
achieve outcome and legislative success. Brown notes that the greater the degree of
radicalism of the group’s goals, the lower the rate of achievement (Brown 2005, 17).
These categories of success measurement take into account internal and external factors
that influence a group’s operation and results of their campaigns.
On the other hand, Bernstein (2003) presents another set of categories through
which to determine social movement success. The categories, originally framed by
Staggenborg (1995), include political and policy outcomes, mobilization outcomes and
cultural outcomes. Bernstein focuses on the relationship between various strategies and
outcomes used by activists, usually finding that the political opportunities highly
influence strategic choices and in turn, the results achieved. Scholars of political process
theory argue that mobilization takes place in light of specific political opportunities,
placing emphasis on the external political environment being conducive to the
movement’s goals and initiatives. Although true, Bernstein also emphasizes that the
strategic choices of activists are a result of how they understand the relationship between
mobilization, political, and cultural effects.
As many scholars examine political impacts as determinants of success, powerful
political actors usually dominate the spotlight. However, Morris (2000) urges
consideration of the impact of human agency, not only from powerful political actors but

10

also challengers in less powerful positions. Morris argues that the importance of non-elite
players, such as grassroots volunteers, is often overlooked in the success of social
movements. As mentioned earlier, these grassroots actors serve as internal resources to
the social movement.
In order to assess the success of the Treatment Action Campaign, it will be
necessary to examine resource mobilization and political opportunity as explained by
Giugni and Bernstein. Jenkin’s offers insight into the internal and external resources
involved in resource mobilization. Morris highlights the importance of non-elite players,
who are crucial to TAC’s grassroots operation to recruit members. Consideration of nonelite actors is instrumental to TAC’s ability to mobilize human resources.
Indeed, social movement scholars have provided a plethora of ways in which to
measure success. My study of the Treatment Action Campaign, using the political
process model and resource mobilization model, will allow for examination of both
internal and external factors influencing the organization’s effectiveness in the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa. Given South Africa’s unique political history and
scope of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, examination of the political opportunity strcuture will
be necessary. And since TAC is highly praised for its success in mobilizing hundreds to
thousands of people, I will examine TAC’s mobilization potential as well as framing
within the South African cultural and social context.

RESEARCH DESIGN
I will assess social movement success by examining the Treatment Action
Campaign, an advocacy organization in South Africa. The very name of this organization
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often perplexes the observer. If the Treatment Action Campaign is a non-profit nongovernmental organization, why do they call themselves the Treatment Action
Campaign? The term “campaign” signifies a far different meaning than would a name
such as the Treatment Action Organization. Although TAC’s name incorporates the term
campaign rather than organization, it is nevertheless a non-governmental organization,
meaning that it operates separate from the government. TAC does not accept government
funding in an effort to maintain its independence.
In order to study social movement success, we must clarify what social
movements are. For our purposes, social movements are collective challenges identified
by a group with a shared purpose and social solidarity, engaged in the effort of sustained
interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities (Tarrow 1998). They mount claims
against their opponents after identifying common or overlapping interests and values.
However, in order to launch a social movement they must be able to maintain their
challenge. Social movement scholar, Della Porta (2006) notes social movements are
fluid, adjusting to the political and social contexts from which they emerge.
Organizations that function within social movements can be referred to as
“professional” social movement organizations (SMO). In some cases, a single
organization will drive a movement (Della Porta 2006). These organizations are more
rigid and hierarchical in structure and usually exert a higher degree of social control over
their members. We will find that the Treatment Action Campaign functions as a lead
social movement organization.
Although the Treatment Action Campaign is a social movement organization,
they include campaign in their organization title. A campaign is defined as a collection of
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strategically connected activities which are explicitly organized by a group of network
members in pursuit of a common goal and usually against a specific target (Keck and
Sikkink 1998, 6). In a campaign, the core network actors are able to create a common
frame of meaning which is then used to mobilize people and organizations. This process
occurs as the network actors negotiate within and among the groups in the network and
connect the groups to each other. They also seek out resources such as information,
leadership, and symbolic or material capital while also proposing activities and
conducting public relations (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 7). Activists identify problems,
specifying the cause of such problems, and then propose solutions. Here, the activists
keep in mind that their goal is to not only solve the issue but also seek to produce
procedural, normative, and substantive change in the broader area of concern (Keck and
Sikkink 1998, 8). In this study, a number of TAC’s campaigns will be examined.

How to Measure Success
The goal of this study is to create a framework to analyze social movement
organizations and apply it to the case of TAC. Using the success framework I will
determine whether or not TAC is a successful social movement organization. Therefore,
it is first necessary to identify the key variables of this study, as well as how they will be
measured.
The assessment of TAC’s success will be based on examination of the
independent variables and dependent variables. Here the independent variables are the
factors influencing success: mobilization potential, external political opportunity
structure, and framing and social context of the issues (See Figure 1). The dependent
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variable is success which will be measured through the examination of political and
cultural/social outcomes. (See Figure 2).
In this study, the independent variables are the factors that influence the success
of the SMO. Before attempting to evaluate the success of TAC, I will explore the
independent variables by looking at three dynamics that influence success. These include:
Independent
Variables
The factors that influence
success

External
Political
Opportunity
Structure

Mobilization
Potential

Internal
resources

External
Resources

Human capital – high
profile players,
professional staff,
members, local

Funding, facilities,
media, other orgs,
international affiliates

Constitution
and
Court system

Post-apartheid
civil society

Framing
and
Social Context
of the issues

Public opinion
(Afrobarometer)
Presence of
counter-messages
(AIDS denialism)

Figure 1. The Independent Variable

(1) the mobilization potential of the SMO, (2) the external political opportunity structure
in which the SMO operates, and (3) the framing and social context of the issues the SMO
tackles. I recognize that these variables are often intermingled and compliment one
another. For example, mobilization potential and political opportunity structure often go
hand in hand. However, for my purposes of identifying the factors that influence success
I will separate these variables and examine them separately.
For the specific case of the Treatment Action Campaign, I will examine the first
independent variable, mobilization potential of the SMO, the exploration of TAC’s
accrual of both internal and external resources. An internal resource like human capital is
14

generated by the involvement of high profile players, skilled professionals, and members
of the local community who fill staff and volunteers roles within the organization.
External resources include financial funding, facilities, and material goods. Other
elements that contribute to the mobilization potential include the SMO’s collaboration
and connection to the media, other civil society organizations, international affiliates and
financial donors. These internal and external resources shape the mobilization potential of
the SMO, which then influences the success of the social movement. In order to grasp the
size of TAC’s mobilization potential I will look at the human capital of the organization
and its network of donors and other civil society organizations.
I will explore the second independent variable, political opportunity structure, by
examining the creation of the post-apartheid Constitution and how this new Constitution
provides an enabling environment in which TAC can make claims on issues surrounding
HIV/AIDS. Other components of the political structure include the operation of the Court
system and whether or not it allows the SMO to take legal action against the government.
In conjunction with the examination of the South African Constitution and court system, I
will discuss the atmosphere of post-apartheid civil society which provided the momentum
for the creation of TAC as a leading social movement organization.
The third independent variable to be explored is the framing of issues within the
society. The framing of issues is vital to the organization’s ability not only to gain
members but also to give the community at large insight into why the issues proposed by
the social movement are important and how the issues should be confronted. The social
context can determine what issues the organization chooses to take up. Therefore, I will
look at public perceptions of the severity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the issues
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related to it using data from public opinion surveys known as the Afrobarometer. I will
also explore the presence of counter-messages such as AIDS denialism, supported by
former President Thabo Mbeki, the Health Minister, and traditional healers, and how that
has played a role in framing issues with the social movement.
Now I am ready to begin assessment of the dependent variable of success (refer
to Figure 2). Since the impact of social movements is multidimensional, success will be
conceptualized as a function of two outcomes: (1) political outcome, (2) cultural/social
outcome. Political outcome is the change in the government or legislative level which
includes changes or creation of government policies. Cultural/social outcomes, which can
also be referred to as social outcomes, are the changes in social norms, beliefs, and
behaviors. I contend that a positive outcome in both areas is necessary for the success of
a SMO, because each outcome has a domino effect on the next outcome. For example, a
positive political outcome will allow for a positive cultural/social outcome. Positive
achievement in both outcomes is necessary for success of the SMO. A positive political
outcome must translate into a positive social/cultural outcome for the SMO to be consider
successful. In the end, a positive political and social/cultural outcome will constitute
success of the Treatment Action Campaign.
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Dependent
Variable
Success

Political outcome
Number of cases heard and won
Creation of policy
Alteration of policy
Implementation of policy
(objectives met)

Cultural/social outcome
Counter AIDS denialism
Traditional healers – Matthias Rath
Treatment adherence increase
HIV/AIDS stigma decrease

Figure 2. The Dependent Variable

The political outcome of the Treatment Action Campaign will be measured by
counting the number of policies changed or created, whether the goals within policies are
met, and the number of victories in cases in which TAC takes the South African
government or international pharmaceutical companies to court. It will be concluded that
the political outcome is positive if the organization is successful in creating or changing
policies in accordance with their targeted goals. Certainly, winning court cases in favor of
TAC’s position will constitute a positive outcome. However, the inability to successfully
alter policy or government denial of the creation of policy will be considered as a
negative political outcome, as well as losing court cases. TAC’s involvement in the
creation of the National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS and the SMO’s pressure on the
government for the creation of a policy on the prevention of mother to child transmission
of HIV will be closely examined. TAC is known to exert pressure on the government and
has even sued the government and taken it to court for failure to comply with national
policies and legislation. The results of pivotal cases such as Minister of Health v. TAC
(2002) will be assessed to see if a positive political outcome is achieved.
17

But, TAC’s court involvement is not limited to targeting the government. TAC’s
struggle to increase access to treatment has led it to target pharmaceutical companies as
well. Hence, I will examine the results of the case TAC v. MSD and Merck. A court
ruling in favor of TAC’s position will be considered to be a positive outcome as opposed
to a court ruling in favor of the pharmaceutical companies being considered as a negative
outcome. Therefore, the change and creation of policy in addition to winning court cases
will add up to a positive political outcome, leading the organization in the direction of
success.
The second outcome to be examined to determine if the Treatment Action
Campaign is successful is the cultural and social outcome. Cultural outcomes can occur
in shifting belief systems and practices. As I examine the role of AIDS denialism by both
the former Health Minister and the former President, I will explore whether or not TAC
has exerted a positive influence to counter-act and reduce AIDS denialism. Also, the use
of traditional healers and cures will be examined. For example, the case of Matthias Rath,
a self-proclaimed traditional healer who provides vitamins as AIDS cures, will be
studied. I will examine how the TAC has tackled the case of Rath’s so-called AIDS cure
and how this has or has not altered cultural beliefs about the disease and its treatment.
The cultural outcome of TAC’s efforts will be determined by whether or not TAC has
influenced society enough to lead the public to deny Rath’s claims. This will be assessed
through data from newspapers’ documentation of public opinion. If TAC’s effort reduces
AIDS denialism, it will be counted as positive. Also, decreased stigma of HIV positive
status as well as greater understanding and adherence to treatment will contribute to a
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positive social outcome. This is to be assessed through analysis of the efforts in TAC’s
Cool Youth and Treatment Literacy campaigns at the grassroots level.
For the Treatment Action Campaign to be a successful social movement
organization, it must be found that it has achieved a positive political outcome and
positive cultural/social outcome. The mobilization potential will affect the political
outcome. If positive outcomes are accomplished, I will deem TAC successful.
A case study of the Treatment Action Campaign of South Africa will be valuable
for several reasons. The HIV/AIDS crisis across the sub-Saharan region affects twothirds of all people suffering with AIDS globally. According to UNAIDS, South Africa
has the largest HIV epidemic in the world. In the depths of this epidemic, the Treatment
Action Campaign has emerged with the goal of increasing access to treatment for those
living with HIV/AIDS. TAC has served as a model social movement for groups in other
countries on the continent also experiencing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Observers often
ponder why they are not able to mobilize and launch a movement like that of the
Treatment Action Campaign.
Not only has the Treatment Action Campaign been recognized nationally and
within the region, it has also been in the international spotlight. In addition to its Nobel
nomination, TAC has also been featured in the New York Times on several occasions as
well as in Time Europe, where journalist Peter Hawthorne referred to TAC as the
“country's leading AIDS activist movement.” Other international organizations such as
OXFAM and the Ford Foundation have supported and funded TAC in their efforts in the
fight against the epidemic.
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Certainly, TAC’s international, regional and domestic popularity as well as
publicity have increased over the past decade. But is TAC truly as successful as it is
perceived to be? This study seeks to analyze the true success of TAC by engaging social
movement theory.

Organizational Structure of TAC
In order to do so, we must explore the organization on multiple levels. TAC
operates as four levels – national, provincial, district and branch levels. The National
Office, located in Cape Town, is the political arm of the organization. Staff and
volunteers often deal with representatives of government and seek to influence health
policies while also drawing attention to government noncompliance with its own
legislation.
TAC has six provincial offices in nine of South Africa’s provinces. I will focus on
the Western Cape Provincial office in order to see how it manages the multiple district
offices within the province. The Western Cape Provincial office, where I was able to
work for four weeks in January and February 2008, is mainly responsible for
administrative tasks and organization of district-level activities, including thousands of
community members in order to protest for various causes.
Next are the district offices. The Khayelitsha District office in Site B is the largest
district in TAC and serves as the model district. I will examine the Khayelitsha district
office and the multiple campaigns run through this office. The district offices are
primarily the ones responsible for the branches within their district. The Khayelitsha
district office manages 14 branches within the area, which together mobilize existing
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members and recruit new members. The district and branch levels are the social arms of
the organization. They play an enormous role in mobilizing members of the community.

Data Sources
The case study of the Treatment Action Campaign will be developed through data
gathered from multiple primary and secondary sources. My trip to South Africa (through
the UConn Honors in Cape Town program in 2008) allowed me to carry out participant
observation of the inner workings of the Treatment Action Campaign in Cape Town.
Observations of the organization were collected from January to April 2008, during
which time I served as an intern in several TAC offices. I began in TAC’s Western Cape
Provincial Office working for 21 hours per week, from January to February 2008. Most
of this time was spent preparing for TAC’s Western Cape Provincial Congress, attended
by TAC delegates from 14 branches within the Western Cape along with staff and
volunteers from the TAC National Office. In preparation for the Congress, I worked
under the supervision of the Western Cape Coordinator Fredalene Booysen. My
responsibilities included database management of over 1000 TAC members and
volunteers; drafting letters and invitations for the Congress; and preparing packets to be
distributed at the Congress.
After attending the Western Cape Provincial Congress from February 8-10, 2008, I
transferred to the Khayelitsha District office, where I interned for 24 hours per week for a
period of 10 weeks. During this time I was given administrative duties as the interim
Administrator of the office, often dealing with the finances of the office as well as reorganizing TAC archives and records of the organization’s various campaigns. I
participated in weekly staff meetings and worked closely with staff members as well as
21

volunteers within the Khayelitsha office. I also attended court cases in the Khayelitsha
Magistrate Court and the Cape Town High Court and also protested and marched
alongside TAC members for various causes within the HIV/AIDS community. I attended
branch meetings within the Khayelitsha District and other events connected with their
various campaigns for youth and treatment literacy.
Though my experience with TAC is not limited to what has been described above,
it afforded me the opportunity gather data through participant observation. I will
supplement this with archival data from the organization as well as internal documents
and publications such as TAC’s Congressional Reports and Equal Treatment, TAC’s
magazine publication. In addition, other primary source data will include South African
government policies outlined in the National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS and
documentation from relevant court cases available through the South African
Government website. In addition, I will use statistical data from the United Nation
available through UNAIDS and the World Health Organization (WHO).
Additionally, I will use secondary sources such as scholarly articles and books
both to deepen my assessment of TAC and to assess the campaign in relation to broader
social movement theory. The work of key authors in social movement literature, such as
Tilly and Tarrow (2007), McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), Giugni (2004) and others
will be closely examined. Articles from scholarly journals such as Social Policy and
Politics & Society have analyzed the Treatment Action Campaign. Several books will be
utilized to further assess TAC’s activities and the political arena in which TAC operates,
such as Alex de Waal’s AIDS and Power: Why There is No Political Crisis - Yet (2006)
and Pieter Fourie’s The Political Management of HIV and AIDS in South Africa (2006).
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This combination of sources will provide me with ample data for answering the
central question at stake: whether or not the “success” of the Treatment Action Campaign
is a fitting reality or an inaccurate impression.

History and Establishment of the Treatment Action Campaign
The Constitution of South African is known to be one of the most progressive in the
world. It includes many of the core human rights central to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, including a range of economic rights.
The Treatment Action Campaign was founded as the next major threat emerged in
the post-apartheid era: the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This epidemic menaces the progression
of the reconstruction and development of the new South Africa, not only impeding the
evolution of economic and political transformation, but also social and cultural growth.
TAC was founded on International Human Rights Day, the 10th of December,
1998. The emergence of a ‘rights based’, ‘patient-driven’ civil society organization was
the result of a fusion of the gay-rights movement during and post-apartheid. The gayrights movement and newly declared Constitution of South Africa allowed for the
germination of such an organization to sprout on firm ground.
During the 1990s the stage was set for the formation of the Treatment Action
Campaign. The distinct democratic culture of the post-apartheid government gave way
for civil society to test its right to freedom of speech, right of assembly and right to
information. Even more, the culture of rights provided a language which would be
significantly utilized by TAC in order to push towards greater access to HIV treatment.
By identifying the potential power of human rights, TAC comrades created an enabling
environment in which to birth a new social movement and fight for socio-economic
23

justice through equal treatment for HIV. In order to provide an explanation of the
political environment in which TAC arose, it is necessary to dive into the history that led
to its establishment.
It was not until 1982 that AIDS had surfaced in South Africa. Into the mid-1980s
it was estimated that somewhere between 10 and 15 percent of gay men in Johannesburg
were infected with HIV. Soon thereafter, the gay rights movement quickly added
HIV/AIDS activism to its agenda. Gay rights activists such as Zackie Achmat and Edwin
Cameron, persons who will be further elaborated upon later, were great contributors to
the formation of the Treatment Action Campaign, in addition to the influences of other
groups and people. One notable influence on TAC was the AIDS Coalition to Unleash
Power, also known as ACT UP, established in the United States in the 1980s. This radical
group targeted pharmaceutical companies and AIDS researchers as well as to the US
government for inadequate attempts to develop an effective HIV Treatment within the
first decade of the epidemic. ACT UP was known for its loud presence, staged ‘lie-ins’
(as opposed to “sit-ins”) and powerful political slogans, all tactics that have influenced
TAC’s activism strategies.
Another significant catalyst to the formation of the TAC was the life and death of
ANC leader and gay-rights/AIDS activist Simon Nkoli. This led Achmat to vow to drive
forward “Nkoli’s struggle for openness and the protection of the rights of people living
with HIV, especially their right to treatment access” (Mbali 2005, 10). Achmat wrote in a
letter to HIV/AIDS activists in 1998 following Nkoli’s death,
“On Friday night at Simon’s funeral I made a call for ten people with HIV/AIDS,
their families and friends and allies to start a symbolic fast for access to treatment
on 10 December 1998… Openness and treatment are two pivotal issues...A
campaign for ‘Openness’ is in reality a call for activism and the assertion of
identity. People with HIV/AIDS are on our own (whether in or out of the closet)
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– while we should seek love, compassion and care – we should also demand
treatment.”

This call for the creation of the TAC was a call for a movement led by HIV positive
activists who are open about their status. Since then, openness about HIV status has been
a pivotal benchmark of the organization’s political and social strategy. Achmat’s call was
met with a mix of thousands of both HIV positive and HIV negative activists wearing tshirts boldly displaying the image ‘HIV POSITIVE.’ This strategy of openness
transformed the HIV epidemic from one that was silent and invisible to one that is
politically loud and vocal with a large visible constituency, which provides leverage to
the equal treatment movement led by the TAC. The promotion of openness proved to be a
powerful political tool.
Whereas in the early 1990s, human rights-focused AIDS activists were directing
their efforts to sustain greater respect for the right to patient confidentiality, in the late
1990s human rights-focused AIDS activists utilized openness and HIV status as a way to
demand greater respect for the socio-economic right to access to health care. This led to
so-called “patient-activism”, driven by people living with HIV/AIDS. This is an attribute
of the TAC which is widely reflected within the organization to this day. Furthermore,
HIV/AIDS discussions were no longer held in the third person, as if speaking of an
abstracted third party, but now taken place in the first person, giving a human face to the
epidemic.
In addition to the creation of an atmosphere of openness, the political arena in the
post-apartheid nature fostered an environment in which an organization such as TAC
could be created. The emergence of TAC was influenced significantly by two historical
developments post 1994: the development of antiretroviral drug therapy, and the adoption
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of the new South African Constitution, which specifically outlined socio-economic rights.
Mobilization was crucial for the former due to two blockages in access to HIV treatment.
The first was the protection of patent monopolies, utilized by the pharmaceutical
industry’s, and the second was AIDS denialism within the government. Several key
government officials, such as President Mbeki and the Health Minister, rejected the
efficacy and safety of HIV treatment due to their AIDS denialist ideologies. Needless to
say, this had resoundingly negative consequences on the HIV/AIDS community.
Before concluding the history and establishment overview, several other notable
persons must be mentioned. As noted earlier, the death of Simon Nkoli spurred Achmat
to carry out Nkoli’s struggle for openness and access to treatment. But near this time,
Gugu Dlamini, a 36 year old woman, openly pronounced her HIV positive status on the
radio at a World AIDS Day ceremony. Three short weeks later, Gugu was murdered by
men in her community because of her HIV positive status. In remembrance of her life and
protest against her needless death, 100 shirts were printed with the logo ‘HIV
POSITIVE.’ Hence, “TAC’s struggle for social justice and the rights of people with HIV
and AIDS had begun” (TAC Diary, 2008).
Since the formation of the TAC, numerous campaigns and court cases have
generated vast media publicity. This has allowed for greater awareness surrounding
HIV/AIDS rights and discrimination as well as mobilizing greater numbers within civil
society. TAC has battled the South African Government and international pharmaceutical
companies in order to press forward for equal treatment for all people. And as TAC
prepares for the future, its members continue to strive for health equality, while
remembering those who they have lost and celebrating those who remain with them.
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ANALYSIS OF TAC SUCCESS
Analysis of TAC’s success will be assessed in two steps. First, I will thoroughly
examine all the independent variables and its multiple components. Then, I will examine
the dependent variable, success, by measuring positive political, cultural, and social
outcomes (refer to Figures 1 and 2).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Now I am ready to assess TAC’s success by first examining the independent
variables of political opportunity structure which involves components including the
Court system and the Constitution among others.

Political Opportunity Structure
Anti-apartheid struggle and post-apartheid civil society
From 1945 to the late 1980s, the majority of South Africans experienced
displacement, deprivation and discrimination to the fullest extent through the apartheid
policies set in place by the National Party. Segregation and racial discrimination were
codified in law, which led to the dislocation of black and “colored” South Africans into
homelands or Bantustans, the outskirts of urban areas. To this day, millions of black and
colored South Africans reside in the townships that were created as a result of apartheid,
many of which are still without electricity or running water.
The legalization of racial discrimination led to the deprivation of citizenship for
all but the small white minority. This resulted in poverty and diease among the displaced
black and colored population. The race ideology of black inferiority was repeatedly
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confirmed through law and practice, resulting in segregation realities that ravaged the
quality of living in every way possible for black and colored people (London 2004, 8).
The segregation policies were implemented to the fullest extent possible, especially in the
quality of health care afforded to each group.
Dislocation and segregation plunged the black and colored communities into
extreme poverty. Poverty then manifested itself in violence and disease throughout their
communities. During the dismantling of apartheid, which began in the 1980s, health
became a large concern to anti-apartheid activists.
The end of apartheid was largely achieved by the anti-apartheid movement. The
anti-apartheid struggle was fought through utilization of the courts and the media, in
addition to local and transnational advocacy networks, along with grassroots mobilization
and skillful negotiations (Robins and von Lieres 2004, 582). Activism within this time
period gave TAC a greater political understanding of fighting oppression and creating a
movement. TAC situated itself within anti-apartheid politics, a result of the experience of
TAC’s founding leadership, “who cut their activist teeth during the anti-apartheid
struggles of the 1980s” (ibid). The anti-apartheid struggle provided the political
opportunity for the formulation and growth of TAC.
It was also during this time that the movement to realize the right to health as a
human right began, immediately following the death of Steve Biko. In 1977 Biko, a
political activist, was detained and tortured to death. Apolitical health professionals found
the complicity of Biko’s medical doctors to be unethical and deeply offensive. In an
effort to address this injustice, these health professionals signed petitions, wrote letters,
marched holding placards, and even joined organizations that would spur change.
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In addition to Biko’s death and the dismantling of apartheid’s segregationist
policies, the post-apartheid reality of the socioeconomic status of black and colored South
Africans continued to have its racial divide. Black and colored South Africans still
experience higher prevalence of disease and mortality in contrast to the white minority. It
was easy to see the crippling ramifications of apartheid policies on those who lived in
homelands in terms of poor quality of living and health. Not surprisingly, in the postapartheid era TAC and others focused on the right to health, largely in response to the
devastation of the physical well-being of the majority of the population.
The political opportunity was made clear after 1994. With the defeat of the
apartheid regime, the former opponents were now obliged to implement policies and
programs advocated for in the anti-apartheid struggle. Thus, the health ministers at the
national and provincial levels began to implement pro-poor policies in the health and
social service sectors (London 2004, 8). This, coupled with the human rights discourse
developed in the anti-apartheid struggle, led to an emerging partnership between civil
society and the new government in the development and implementation of new health
policies. TAC took advantage of this political opportunity and made an effort to shape
public policy for the health and equity of marginalized groups.

South African Constitution and Court System
South Africa’s newly adopted post-apartheid Constitution was adopted in 1996
and is now known to be the most progressive Constitution in the world. Chapter 2 of the
South African Constitution features a Bill of Rights in which Articles 7 through 39
specify various civil and political rights in addition to socioeconomic rights. Article 27
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states, “Everyone has the right to have access to

health care services, including

reproductive health care; The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights” (South African Constitution). The inclusion of the socioeconomic right to health
makes this a very progressive Constitution, thus allowing citizens direct access to make
claims to such rights as human rights.
Even more, the South African Constitution states rights of citizens to have
remedies for the enforcement of their rights. Article 38 specifies this right stating,
“Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.” This article furthermore elaborates
that a person can approach the court seeking not only their own interest, but also on
behalf of the public interest. Article 34 ensures citizens the right to access the courts.
This opens the door for TAC to access the courts and make the claims it does.
The South African court system is similar to the U.S. court system. From top to
bottom the court system is composed of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of
Appeals, High Courts of South Africa (ten provincial divisions and three local divisions),
Circuit Courts, and nine specialized courts. The specialized courts consist of a court on
taxes, labor, divorce, land claims, a water tribunal, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC), magistrates, small claims and community courts (Constitutional
Court of South Africa).
A case can go to the Constitutional court through various means, but only two
methods are relevant for the work of TAC. A case can go to the Constitutional Court
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“as the result of an appeal from a judgment of the High Court or the Supreme Court of
Appeal or as a direct application to the Court, asking it to sit as a court of first and last
instance because of the urgency of the matter” (CITE Const. Ct website)
I will explore a few of TAC’s most pivotal cases , one of which was heard in the
Cape Town High Court and another in the Constitutional Court.

Mobilization Potential
Internal Resources
Internal resources of SMOs are human capital, which consists of professional
staff, high profile players, organization members, and local community members. I will
examine each of these components as they relate to TAC and contribute to its
mobilization potential (refer to Figure 1).

Staff and Membership
Today, TAC has an elaborate management system, composed of a two-tier
governing body and offices at the national, provincial and district levels (refer to Figure
1). These offices allow the organization to function at the political level alongside the
South African government, and also recruit and provide serves at the grassroots level.
TAC’s many campaigns, events, and activities are all made possible through the
coordinated efforts of paid staff and volunteers.
However, the present-day management system of the organization and the sheer
number of staff and volunteers that allow for the operation of TAC did not exist a decade
ago. In 2000, just two years after the birth of TAC, the organization’s staff consisted of
three individuals and 800 members. Four years later, in 2004, TAC’s paid staff grew to
31

46. Then in 2006, the organization’s staff expanded to 67 and an estimated 16,000
members. Within the same year, TAC also attracted 350 interns (CITE).
TAC’s founders, South African native Zackie Achmat and Mark Heywood,
originally from London, continue to play a large role within the organization even ten
years after it was established. Achmat and Heywood are currently placed among the top
positions within the organization. Achmat and Heywood serve in the National Executive
Committee (NEC), the highest authority and decision making body of TAC, respectively
as chairperson and treasurer. Achmat became the international face of the organization
early on in the development of TAC (Robins 2004, 663). Heywood not only plays an
active role in TAC but has simultaneously been involved with the AIDS Law Project in
South Africa since 1994 and now serves as the project head. He is also the Deputy Chair
of the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC). Heywood’s participation in these
organizations and activism in the anti-apartheid movement since the 1980s makes him a
knowledgeable and valuable resource to the organization. Both Achmat and Heywood
have advanced degrees, adding to the professional staff in the organization.
TAC also has a group of lawyers who have facilitated in numerous court cases,
some of which will be examined later. These lawyers provide countless hours of service
on behalf of the organization. TAC attracts the services of lawyers from the Legal
Resource Centre (LRC), South Africa’s largest public interest law center founded in
1979. In addition to these legal professionals, many middle-class business and health
professionals, as well as scientists have volunteered their services for TAC’s initiatives
(Robin 2004, 665).
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Over the years, the increasing number of staff and members is reflected in the
growth and creation of new districts and branches. TAC now has 10 districts with 49
active branches. The district offices organize events within the district in addition to
facilitating meetings at the branch level. The district offices employ paid staff and
volunteers, whereas the branches are solely composed of unpaid volunteers and local
community members. The districts and branches create the backbone of the organization
since they are the predominant recruiting bodied within the organization.
Currently, Khayelitsha (which is in the Western Cape Province) is the largest
district in TAC, with 14 active branches. As the largest growing district within the
organization, Khayelitsha serves as a model district. The organization strives to develop
all the other districts to be comparable not just in size but also in terms of the functional
abilities of the Khayelitsha model.

External Resources
Funding
Since its founding, TAC has increased in its size in staff and membership as well
as the scope of its campaigns and activities. This is made possible through the increase in
human resources outlined above, as well as through the significant increase in funding the
organization has experienced over the years. TAC does not receive any funding from the
African National Congress, South Africa’s governing political party since apartheid, and
thus relies heavily on donations.
At the onset of the organization, TAC’s generated revenue amounted to little over
R200,000, about US$32,000. In 2004, TAC’s income increased to about R14.5 million,
about US$1.9 million. At the end of 2008, the organization reported an income of R36.7
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million, about US$5.1 million (see Appendix A for full budget figures). Most of the
income was generated through international donations from various organizations and
individuals. In the fiscal year of 2007-08, the largest donors were the Swedish
International Development Agency and Atlantic Philanthropies, a U.S. based private
foundation. Other large donors include Medecins San Fronteieres (MSF or Doctors
without Borders), OXFAM Australia, and the Royal Netherlands Foundation.
The Treatment Action Campaign does not receive any funding from USAID
because “it is seen to promote the interests of the US Government,” or pharmaceutical
companies (Friedman and Mottiar 2005, 517).

Facilities
In order for the organization to operate, offices were set up for each province and
district. Only one office exists for the national level, which was recently relocated to
Cape Town from Muizenberg. Each of the districts within TAC has its own office and set
of paid staff. TAC’s income allows for each office to be equipped with computers and
full internet and phone services. Each province and district office is allocated funds for
paid staff positions and material resources according to the district’s size and functional
capacity, which is determined by the national office. The largest district, Khayelitsha has
office space thanks to MSF’s generous offer to provide office space for them across from
its own.

Media
TAC’s presence within the media is considerable. Due to TAC’s highly
politicized events such as campaigns, marches, protests and court cases, newspaper
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consistently showcase these events. The organization tackles so many issues related to
HIV/AIDS and is entrenched so deeply in the political and social dimensions of the
disease that TAC is visible in multiple arenas. The set up of the organizational structure
demonstrates how TAC is able to operate on so many different levels.
The organization’s media connections are not limited to newspapers. When
planning protests, marches or other high profile events, TAC often calls upon local and
national radio and news stations to cover their event. This is often done through a media
coverage request faxed to the various media stations.

Networking
From the founding of the organization TAC has utilized networking and
partnerships as a vital tool to achieve their objectives. Realizing that HIV/AIDS has many
political and socioeconomic dimensions it was not difficult to cultivate alliances with
other movements or organizations. In the immediate post-apartheid transition in 1994,
TAC allied itself with the Trade Union Movement (London 2004, 10).

TAC also

developed long-standing relationships with the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU), a partner in the Tri-partite Alliance with the African National Congress and
the South African Communist Party, as well as Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF).
Positioning itself with COSATU has proven to be critical for TAC’s political
engagements. Although, it is unknown whether if this was intentional, the Western Cape
Provincial office is in Salt River, Cape Town, with their office sharing the floor of a
building with COSATU.

Framing and Social Context
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My study focuses on the decade of 1998-2008, the first decade of the Treatment
Action Campaign takes place during a pivotal time in South African history. The birth of
TAC took place in the post-apartheid era in which new rights were asserted during a time
of economic redistribution. The early 1990s also mark the onset of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. Being aware of the social context in which TAC arose will allow for
examination of TAC’s strategic framing. I will examine how TAC maneuvered the
political environment and social context of AIDS to strategically create frames in which
to work. This exploration will show interplay between political opportunity, mobilization,
and framing as well as a dynamic interchange between TAC’s frames and other counter
frames. The process is an interactive dialogue where one side presents an argument and
the other a counter argument.
Given the social and political context of South African history, we will see three
main time periods in which TAC implemented different frames. First, I will look at the
period of 1998 to 2000, the early years of setting the rights debate; second, the period of
2000 to 2003, the rise of the AIDS denialism and pseudoscience; and lastly, the period of
2003-2008, when TAC seeks to see government action and treatment roll-out.
As noted by Zald, cultural context and historical events provide opportunities for
framing (1996, 261). In this case, the struggle out of apartheid and the formation of the
post-apartheid South African Constitution set the framework for people to assert their
rights. The new Constitution, not only gave HIV-positive people the authority to claim
their right to health but to equal citizenship and access to treatment. It was during this
time that TAC framed their initiatives in terms of claiming their rights and therefore
obliging the government to provide life saving medications for HIV-positive people
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(Vandormael 2007, 226). TAC created the movement as an assertion to their right to
treatment, pressing the government for more affordable drug treatments and policies to
implement a nation-wide treatment plan.
Initially TAC gained momentum in their mobilization capacity and exercising
their demands against the government. But in 2000, President Thabo Mbeki began to
outwardly support AIDS dissident science, speaking out against the intellectual
foundations of AIDS health science and policy (Butler 2005, 594). It was during this time
that Mbeki discredited AIDS science, denying the causal link between HIV and AIDS
and positing that antiretrovirals (ARVs) may be poisonous and lethal. Facing public
critics, such as academics, opposition parties, AIDS activists, and health professionals
who all spoke out against dissident AIDS science, Mbeki created his own AIDS advisory
panel. Mbeki established the President’s Select Advisory Panel of AIDS Experts (see
Figure 3), composed of ‘established scientists’ and AIDS dissidents (Robins 2004, 658).
With the rise of AIDS dissident science, the use of traditional healers and
medicine became an increasing norm amongst the South African community. With
dissident science being supported by the President, existing myths about AIDS gained
momentum as well. Common myths about AIDS included that it was the product of
witch-craft, a punishment from God, a disease created by the United States, CIA to
deplete the African population or created by drug companies to create drug markets. Even
more, some believed that lubricants in condoms were the source of HIV, sex with infants
of virgins would cure AIDS or ARVs were toxic. Alongside this plethora of myths and
conspiracy theories stood President Mbeki flirting with dissident science, creating a
government of policy makers and politicians that sustained AIDS denialism.
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The government support of AIDS denialism was also shared with some traditional
healers. One traditional healer, Matthias Rath, a German national, received much
attention from TAC for his distribution of vitamins as an AIDS cure and clinical trials on
HIV-positive individuals, eventually leading to the death of two clinical trial participants.
Matthias Rath, a self-proclaimed traditional healer, is not alone in developing
concoctions as AIDS cures and treatments. Others in township areas of the Cape Flats
have advertised their home-grown herb supplements and drink mixtures that would cure
the symptoms of AIDS. These traditional healers related to the link between body and
spirit, targeting that as the source of AIDS.

Figure 3. President Mbeki’s Select Advisory Panel of International AIDS Experts

38

With AIDS dissident science within the government, the spread of AIDS-related
myths and conspiracy theories and practice of traditional healers, conventional science
regarding AIDS was severely undermined. Therefore, TAC sought to counter these
frames with another intellectual frame. This was done through a strategic approach in
which TAC created an intellectual campaign in the early 2000s, relying on the expert and
professional training for TAC members. More on this will be discussed later.
Initially, TAC used a rights claiming frame in response to the political
opportunity created by the post-apartheid Constitution. Mobilization was possible given
the continued strength of the post-apartheid civil society. Then TAC shifted its frame
from a rights discourse to an intellectual campaign as a counter argument to AIDS
dissident science. In later years, the mid to late 2000s, TAC had to re-focus itself after
victories in cases against the government and pharmaceutical companies. TAC re-framed
its strategy to largely focus on pressing the government for implementation of policies
and treatment plans they had promised.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MEASURING SUCCESS
Now that I have examined the independent variables that affect success, I am
ready to assess the success of TAC by examining political and cultural/social outcomes.
Examining each outcome requires determining whether or not the outcome is positive as
mentioned previously. Positive outcomes will contribute to success.
The strategies used by the Treatment Action Campaign will now be examined to
assess whether this social movement organization has achieved success. This will be
done by examining the dependent variable, success, as a composite of two parts: the
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political outcome and social outcome of TAC’s activities (refer to Figure 2). The first
part to be measured is its political outcome, which has four indicators: 1) the number of
legal cases won by TAC; 2) the creation of new public policy on HIV/AIDS; 3) the
reform of existing policy; and finally 4) the implementation of new and existing policies
overall. Then the social outcome will be measured, also with four indicators, as follows:
1) TAC’s strategies in countering AIDS denialism; 2) the creation of policies to counter
the work of traditional healers; 3) the increase of treatment adherence; and 4) the overall
decrease of HIV/AIDS stigma and misperceptions.

Political Outcome
Firstly, I will examine what TAC has achieved given the political structure
developed throughout the anti-apartheid era, specifically by examining TAC’s strategies
within the democratization process of South Africa. This exploration will focus on TAC’s
use of the new South African Constitution and court system in which new rights were
asserted. Then I will look at the effects of TAC’s political victories have had on the social
dimension, by examining TAC’s strategies at the local and grassroots levels which
allowed for the overturning of AIDS denialism and greater education surrounding the
disease.
Success will be determined by reviewing TAC’s strategies and victories over
time. Political outcomes will be measured by assessing whether or not TAC achieved a
positive or negative outcome in terms of the goals it pursued. A positive outcome is one
in which TAC’s specific goal was achieved whereas a negative outcome is one where
TAC’s goal was not achieved. For example, did TAC win the court cases it brought to the
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High Court or Constitutional Court of South Africa? Did TAC successfully press the
South African government to put HIV/AIDS and treatment access on the political agenda
through the creation of specific public policies? And now, is TAC successfully pushing
the government to implement the policies to the fullest extent possible. In the pursuit of
each of these goals, I will show how TAC’s advocacy draw on historic repertoires of
contention honed in during the anti-apartheid struggle.

Striving for Treatment Access and Policy Creation (1998 to 2003)
From 1998, when TAC was first founded, to 2003 the organization heavily
focused on campaigning for wider access to HIV/AIDS treatment. TAC created this goal
because the organization identified the dangers presented by the rejection of the safety
and efficacy of HIV treatments promoted by dissident scientists (Mbali 2005, 19).
Consequently, TAC sought to battle the South African government and multinational
pharmaceutical companies to provide greater access to HIV drugs for people.
By the end of 1998, TAC had already initiated a campaign for the Prevention of
Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV (PMTCT). In this campaign TAC demanded that
the government provide access to azathioprine (AZT), a drug that would help prevent
HIV-positive pregnant women from transmitting the virus to their unborn children. Some
government members argued that the drug was too costly while others outwardly denied
the effectiveness of the drug. The Minister of Health would not allow for a program on
PMTCT or dispersal of the drug due to skepticism redarding the efficacy of the drug
(Minister of Health v TAC, 2002).

Meanwhile, President Thabo Mbeki outwardly

proclaimed that AZT was poisonous and life-threatening, not live-saving. For the next
five years, TAC demonstrated and marched throughout South Africa in protest of the
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government and pharmaceutical companies. The case was later presented to the Court in
2002, which will be explored in further detail.
As previously discussed, the anti-apartheid struggle presented new forms of civil
society action. Echoing the anti-dompas (pass law) defiance campaigns of the apartheid
era, TAC created the “Christopher Moraka Defiance Campaign against Patent Abuse” in
2000 (Robins 2004). This civil disobedience campaign aimed to uncover the excessive
profiteering on patented drugs by illegally importing generic drugs from Thailand.
The campaign was named after a TAC volunteer Christopher Moraka who has
died in July 2000 from AIDS-related oral thrush. TAC’s spokespersons claimed that
fluconazole, a drug not available to the public health system due to its exorbitant costs,
would have eased his suffering and pain. TAC publicly announced its intentions to defy
pharmaceutical patents on drugs at a conference in July 2000, while also calling upon
other organizations and individuals to join their campaign. This immediately brought
immense international attention, intensifying the outcry against pharmaceutical giant
Pfizer. After Achmat purchased 5,000 capsules of fluconazole in Thailand, TAC exposed
the profiteering and patent abuse by Pfizer. A 200mg capsule of fluconazole cost R28.57
in the South African public sector and an astonishing R80.24 in the private sector,
whereas in Thailand one capsule cost R1.78. It became clear that Pfizer had inflated
prizes of name-brand medications. This critical identification of pricing differences, in
addition to Pfizer’s unwillingness to reveal their investment and pricing policies, left
Pfizer in a very vulnerable position among international and activist pressure (Bloom
2000).
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Not long after in March 2001, Pfizer finally lowered drug prices. The public
pressure built up through TAC’s protests in the form of fasts and rallies throughout Cape
Town and Durban, forced the company to reduce the prizes of their products (Thomas
and Dorono 2004). In state clinics, Pfizer made its drugs available free of charge. This
put TAC on the international forefront with their “David and the Goliath” victory against
a pharmaceutical giant, catapulting the organization into the global arena (Robins 2004).
This victory can obviously be counted as a positive political outcome for TAC.
Though TAC experienced a huge victory against Pfizer, the battle against
pharmaceutical giants was not over. While TAC was also confronting the South African
government in its PMTCT campaign, it was working alongside the government in a court
case initiated by pharmaceutical companies. In March 2001, thirty-nine pharmaceutical
companies, represented through the Pharmaceuticals Manufacturing Association of South
Africa (PMA), brought the South African government to court (OXFAM Policy Report,
April 2001). The PMA claimed that certain amendments to the 1997 Medicines and
Related Substances Act were unconstitutional. The proposed amendments would enable
the government to make drugs more affordable in South Africa by decreasing the prices
of the PMA’s drugs (TAC Diary 2008). The law allowed less expensive generic drugs to
be imported or made in South Africa. Though TAC was not initially involved in the case,
TAC incorporated itself into the court case as a “friend of the court,” or amicus curiae, to
provide evidence relevant to the government’s argument. Here is an example of how
TAC balanced its tactics of conflict and co-operation in its relationship with the
government. In this case, TAC actually acted as an ally to the government rather than
acting in opposition of it.

43

This was a political opportunity that allowed TAC to insert itself not simply
because the government’s goal mirrored TAC’s, but also to demonstrate that TAC is
willing to work with the government. Whereas, in the PMTCT campaign the organization
was mainly battling the government, this case presented an opportunity for TAC to work
cooperatively with the government. In many situations we will see that TAC launches
action as a challenger of the government, thus creating a relationship of conflict.
However in the legal case with the PMA, TAC leaders immediately saw the opportunity
to show that its goal is not to create hostility with government, but to win greater access
to treatment. In the long run this was a conscientious strategic maneuver to dispel beliefs
that the organization was an enemy to the newly formed democratic government.

Figure 4. Zapiro cartoon featured in The Mail & Guardian on March 6, 2001.

Throughout the involvement of this case, a legal battle which actually began in
1998, the organization assembled and participated in numerous protests and
demonstrations. Between December 1998 and February 2001, TAC organized seven
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public demonstrations in the form of protests and marches (TAC Newsletter March
2001). During this period, TAC’s “Global March for Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment” in
July 2000, involved more than 6000 people. While members, volunteers, and
sympathizers of TAC congregated in protests and marches, its leaders were hard at work.
TAC representatives met with government policy makers and the PMA nine times before
the case was concluded.
In April 2001, the PMA conceded to the numerous national and international
pressures to withdraw its case against the South African government. This was mainly the
result of negative media publicity against the pharmaceutical companies involved such as
Pfizer and Glaxo Wellcome for drug profiteering (Robins and von Lieres 2004). Since
TAC’s marches and protests occurred all over the country, it received much media
attention as well, both domestically and internationally. This also helped cast a negative
light on the pharmaceutical companies and won international sympathy for South Africa
and TAC’s claim against the PMA.
Overall, TAC’s involvement in the PMA case was crucial to the government’s
success against the international pharmaceutical industry. Mobilization and collective
action brought international and national attention to the issue, which then shamed the
pharmaceutical companies into withdrawing the case. While thousands gathered for
public protests in South Africa, TAC also implemented a highly successful global media
campaign, convincing international public opinion that pharmaceutical companies had a
moral obligation to make drugs affordable (Robins 2004). If the numerous protests and
marches and international media campaign had not occurred, the pharmaceutical
companies may not have wanted to retract the case. This ending can be counted as
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another positive outcome. TAC’s goal was to further government efforts to make drugs
more affordable to South Africans. Dismissal of the PMA case opened the stage for the
implementation of the legal framework created through the Medicines Act to be finalized,
thus allowing for cheap and effective drugs to reach the people. Finally, South Africa was
able to have more affordable drugs and manufacture generics within the country.
Though a long and protracted court case with the PMA was avoided, TAC’s break
from the courts amounted to only a brief intermission. In 2001, after years of government
lethargy and disregard for the creation of a national PMTCT program, TAC took
advantage of a political opportunity to take the Minister of Health to court. The case of
the Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) arose out of years of
struggle to pressure the government to implement a PMTCT program but more
specifically in response to discriminatory legislation created by the South African
government. In August 2001, a government policy was made outlining the distribution of
the drug Nevirapine (NVP) in public health institutions. This drug helps to prevent
mother-to-child HIV transmission at birth. A few pharmaceutical companies had offered
Nevirapine to South Africa at no cost for a period of five years. However, the
government did not allow for wide disbursement of this drug, claiming that it must be
subject to tests and research before being distributed to the public. The government did
allow the drug to be made available in two sites, but not to the public at large. TAC
challenged this policy since the Medicine Control Council, a specialist body responsible
for testing drug safety, had registered NVP as a safe drug. TAC argued that the
government’s concern about the drug’s safety was baseless. The government policy
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allowed for a small number of people with the financial means to access private health
facilities to have access to this drug.
When the Constitutional Court heard the case, they agreed with TAC’s claim to
assert the right to health and the rights of children. It was found that Sections 27 and 28
of the South African Constitution create a positive obligation on the State to promote
access to health care (Robins and von Lieres 2004). The Court went even further and
determined that the government has a constitutional obligation to provide a
comprehensive policy to combat mother-to-child HIV transmission and thus far has failed
to meet that obligation. The outcome of this case asserted that the government does have
a constitutional obligation to meet the positive duties stipulated in the Constitution in
regards to access to health care. In the end, TAC received a positive outcome in the case
of the Minister of Health v. TAC (2002) when the Court ruled in its favor. However, the
outcome of the case could not have been possible without the provisions in the South
African Constitution on health and child rights and the precedent case Grootbroom
(2000). Once again, we see that democratization of South Africa paved the way for these
rights to be asserted.
While this case was in the court, TAC mobilized over five thousand TAC
supporters to march outside the Constitutional Court, and also conducted a series of
“Stand Up for Your Rights” marches all over South Africa. On February 14, 2003, TAC
held its largest march to date, with over 20,000 participants supporting TAC’s demand
for a treatment plan. After all the victories TAC had experienced in its litigation against
government and pharmaceutical companies, activism was fueled against perceived failure
of government to address treatment access. This led to another civil disobedience
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campaign in 2003. During this campaign, TAC made the claim that the Minister of
Health and the South African government more generally were culpable for the deaths of
the people who died from AIDS without treatment (TAC Diary 2008).
The government responded to TAC’s numerous demands for a treatment program
with an announcement of extra budget appropriations for HIV/AIDS medical treatment. It
was now time for the government to support ARV treatment and create a national
treatment plan. But the government refused to sign an agreement with the National
Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC) agreeing to an AIDS treatment
plan and failed to fulfill their promises. TAC could not take this lightly and thus initiated
another civil disobedience campaign.
This was a difficult maneuver for TAC to make, since civil disobedience is
typically utilized against governments that the people do not support. The TAC agenda
was one of “reform, not revolution” (De Waal 2007). Though danger of being viewed as
anti-government was present, “TAC leadership judged that the campaign could be
defended and conducted in a way which would not lose it the moral high ground”
(Friedman and Mottiar 2004). Seriously taking into consideration public support and key
organizational allies, TAC initiated non-violent civil disobedience.
Finally in August 2003, the government agreed to a public ARV roll-out program,
a more comprehensive national plan. In November 2003, the government presented the
Operational Plan for Comprehensive Treatment and Care for HIV and AIDS Care,
Management and Treatment for South Africa (the Operational Plan). Up until this point,
TAC had fought relentlessly to force the government to create a treatment plan. Now that
TAC had achieved this goal, a new goal was necessary. TAC shifted its focus from the
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creation of a treatment plan to the implementation of the plan. From 2004 onward, TAC
focused its political efforts on ensuring that the treatment plan was implemented. In
addition to this political goal, TAC made more social goals: to campaign for expanded
treatment literacy and public education and to mobilize for HIV prevention (TAC Diary
2008).

Shifting Focus: Policy Implementation and Prevention (2004 to 2008)
Recognizing all of its political victories, TAC decided to shift focus from the
assertion of human rights to the implementation of the policies that were created through
the victories in court. From 1998 to 2004, TAC spent much of its efforts fighting the
political system that disenfranchised the HIV positive community by demanding
affordable treatments and health policies for treatment programs. Now that these goals
were achieved, TAC shifted gears to see that the programs were effective, providing
treatment to those who need it.
Into the year 2004, TAC kept a close eye on government progress of the ARV
roll-out. Understanding the significance of the roll-out program, TAC helped establish a
joint civil society forum to monitor the government’s implementation of the Operational
Plan. At this point, TAC had already created a number of partnerships with other
organizations. These organizations teamed up with TAC to create the Joint Civil Society
Monitoring and Evaluation Forum (the Forum). The civil society organizations involved
included the AIDS Law Project (ALP), Centre for Health Policy (CHP), Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF), and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), just to name
a few.

49

For purposes of evaluating TAC’s overall “success,” I consider the creation of the
Operational Plan as a positive outcome, as it helped TAC’s goal of ensuring that the
government created a treatment plan. The Operational Plan is the result of the efforts of
TAC in protests, resistance, and litigation. Now TAC’s goal is to see sufficient
implementation of the treatment plan. Although, TAC’s focus has shifted from policy
creation to policy implementation, their tactics have remained largely the same. Also, the
creation of the forum demonstrates how TAC is altering its focus and implementing new
strategies to achieve its goals.
Since February 2004, TAC began pressing the Minister of Health to release
“Annex A,” which prescribes goals for the implementation of the plan, including dates,
sites and targets for the ARV treatment roll-out. By October 2004, the Minister of Health
still refused to disclose the information, even after the Annex was revised. At one point,
the Minister denied it even existed. Without knowledge of the government’s plans and
targets for the Operational Plan, TAC could not hold the government accountable to its
promises. The information was key in order for TAC to assess the implementation of the
policy. TAC launched the Access to Information Campaign and a court case to demand
that the people have a right to know and that the government must release the
information. TAC pointed to Section 32 of the South African Bill of Rights which states,
“Everyone has the right of access to any information held by the state... that is required
for the exercise or protection of any rights.”
In a pamphlet, “Right to Know, Right to Live,” TAC argued that the “access to
information helps communities work with government to improve service delivery”
(TAC 2004). By informing the public about their right to know, TAC once again used a
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rights discourse to achieve its goal. In this campaign TAC conducted marches,
demonstrations, consultations with civil society organizations, and ultimately legal action
against the Minister of Health in the “Annex A Case” (Heywood 2009). In November
2004, the Pretoria High ruled in favor of TAC’s right to access information and ordered
the minister to pay punitive costs for misleading the public. Again, TAC scored another
positive political outcome.
From here on, TAC continued to monitor implementation of the program,
demanding better roll-out in places like Mpumalanga. Much effort was taken to
document progress and produce reports on the roll-out program. This timely research was
vital to ensure that the government was implementing the program in all provinces and
servicing as many people as possible.
In 2006, TAC was in Court again, but this time against the Department of
Correctional Services and the Ministry of Health for denying ARV treatment to prisoners
in Westville Prison. In a September 2006, TAC’s Newsletter disclosed statistics on the
number of deaths in South African prisons. The number of prisoners who have died in
custody from natural causes has risen dramatically from 211 in 1996 to over 1500 in
2005. TAC claimed that this increase in the prison mortality rate was directly attributable
to HIV/AIDS and its intersection with tuberculosis (TB) (TAC 2006).
Again, the Court agreed with TAC in that the rights guaranteed in the South
African Constitution applied to all South Africans. The Court ordered the government
both to provide ARV treatment to prisoners and to submit a treatment plan for the
prisoners. This victory, another positive outcome for TAC, again relied on the South
African Constitution and the assertion of rights to win its claim.
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In 2007, continuing its emphasis on for prevention and implementation of
treatment programs, TAC worked alongside the government to draft a National Strategic
Plan for 2007-2011 for HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections (NSP). This
policy promised to reduce new HIV infections by 50% and to extend treatment to 80% of
people living with HIV. The government quickly adopted the plan. TAC’s resources and
research were crucial to developing a strategic plan for treatment and prevention. Without
the help of TAC, the NSP would not have been created. Here, TAC achieved another
positive outcome.
Overall, TAC had many political successes, demonstrated by all the positive
outcomes discussed above. This was a long process, in which TAC developed a complex
relationship with the South African Government. The evolving relationship between the
government and TAC shows a repertoire of tactics. While TAC worked alongside the
government in the ARV roll-out and creation of the NSP, it also remained critical of the
program’s implementation. TAC was always careful not to act as an ally to the
government or to be too anti-government, understanding the importance of balancing
cooperation and conflict in order to retain public support. I will show the interplay
between the government and TAC to be even more dynamic later, in my discussion of
AIDS denialism and government supported dissident science.
Over the years, TAC has realized that mass mobilization and networking are key
tools in their success, which in turn has created political space for the assertion of health
rights and citizenship. Mass mobilization of women, unemployed people, and HIVpositive individuals showed the government that its promises and obligations within the
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Constitution must be met. Mobilization was the backbone to TAC’s success, a sentiment
often reiterated by TAC co-founder, Nathan Geffen (Friedman and Mottiar 2004).
These varied positive political outcomes are largely a result of the political
opportunity structure. TAC, in turn framed its issues and goals in a manner that helped it
capitalize on the favorable context in order to achieve positive outcomes. The
institutional channels to make political demands were set in place post-apartheid, through
the democratization of South Africa. The Courts provided direct and immediate means of
engagement by TAC leaders, while public civil disobedience, protests, and marches
allowed for involvement of thousands of South African citizens. The political opportunity
provided by the new post-apartheid Constitution and South Africa’s strong human rights
frame work informed the movement’s decision to create a rights frame. For TAC, the
framing process was made possible by the existing political opportunity structure. The
rights frame was vital to TAC’s political success. The continued reliance on claiming and
fulfilling rights led TAC to employ litigation, marches, and protests, all of which had
positive outcomes.

Cultural and Social Outcome
TAC’s first decade was filled with numerous political victories. But as a social
movement, TAC strived not only to influence policy making, but also to make sure that
these policies were translated into practice in the social realm. While the political aspect
of TAC’s work evolved around claiming and asserting rights, the social aspect involved
battling stigma, discrimination, and AIDS denialism within society. Assessment of the
social/cultural outcome will include intensive discussion of government-sponsored
dissident AIDS science, including support of traditional healer Matthias Rath. I will also
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examine TAC’s efforts to influence cultural perceptions and education on HIV/AIDS.
TAC played a large role not only in the political realm of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in
South Africa, but also in prioritizing the social aspects of the pandemic.
In measuring whether success was achieved in the social and cultural spheres, I
will examine the changes in common myths about AIDS and especially the effects of
AIDS denialism. I will also examine TAC’s response to the commonly used medicines
provided by traditional healers, closely exploring TAC’s relationship with Matthias Rath.
An in-depth discussion of Rath will not only expose common beliefs about the disease,
but also show what measures TAC took to combat false information. Furthermore,
assessing the social outcome will require exploration of TAC’s initiatives at the
grassroots level by examining the strategies and programs TAC implemented. We will
see how TAC implemented grassroots meetings, training, and educational programs in
order to combat HIV/AIDS stigma, misinformation, and discrimination.

Countering AIDS Denialism
The realization of the HIV/AIDS epidemic spurred TAC to mobilize for treatment
access. As seen in previous sections, TAC endured long battles with the South African
government and multinational pharmaceutical companies to increase treatment access
and ensure implementation of treatment policy. Yet at the same time, TAC was battling
the disastrous effects of dissident AIDS science supported by President Mbeki and others.
Moreover, traditional healers openly advertised and distributed various substances as
“AIDS cures.” In this section, I will examine how TAC framed and tackled the issue of
government supported AIDS denialism.
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Although dissident AIDS science began in the late 1980s, it did not gain
momentum in South African until President Thabo Mbeki began to support it
(Vandormael 2007). Mbeki’s argument was rooted in a national ideology to protect the
African image from falling victim to Western perceptions that Africans are promiscuous
or sexually deviant. Hence, Mbeki created HIV science based on nationalistic grounds,
emphasizing an overall fear of being victimized by the West. Mbeki’s denialism in the
Western biomedical model began to take drastic turns as he publicly denied the link
between HIV/AIDS and deny the effectiveness of ARV treatment (See Figure 6).

Figure 6. Zapiro cartoon featured in the Mail & Guardian on Nov 8, 1999

TAC was careful in the way it approached AIDS denialism. Throughout rural
areas South Africa, little education and knowledge on HIV/AIDS science or treatment
was available, the threat of AIDS denialism was much more severe. Therefore, TAC has
to delicately frame its opposition to AIDS denialism so as to not fuel arguments that TAC
was anti-government. Initially, TAC described the government’s “denial” as reluctance or
apathy to see the urgency of the AIDS crisis and immediately respond (Vandormael
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2007). Instead of labeling the government as “wrong,” TAC portrayed it as “morally
weak” (Ibid).
But with the gravity of the AIDS crisis intensifying and no retraction in AIDS
denialism, TAC turned to a more dramatic frame. At first, TAC claimed that public
skepticism towards the science of HIV was a function of political, intellectual, and moral
weakness. Then, TAC began to describe the President and Minister of Health’s beliefs
and actions as “evil” and “murder.” Here a link was made between the contestation of
internationally accepted AIDS science and culpability for death.
In order to combat AIDS denialism support by the government, TAC assembled
and implemented what Vandormael (2007) refers to as its “Intellectual Campaign.” This
campaign was primarily driven by an epistemic community, members of the professional
and academic community who contributed their skills and knowledge to counter the
unorthodox views of Mbeki and other AIDS denialists (Vandormael 2007). This
campaign differed from TAC’s traditional campaigns because it did not involve public
protest and other confrontational activities. Rather, the intellectual campaign turned to a
high level of expert specialization on AIDS science to counter the rhetoric preached by
the denialists.
The intellectual campaign occurred from 2000 through 2004, with the epistemic
community playing a key role in pressing the government for a PMTCT program and
litigation mentioned earlier. But in 2005, TAC launched the “2BY6 Campaign,”
advocating for 200,000 HIV positive people to receive ARVs by 2006 (TAC Diary
2008). This campaign also called on the government to denounce AIDS denialism and its
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practitioners such as Matthias Rath. But the government continued to support Rath and
allowed him to sell vitamins as AIDS cures (See Figure 7).
As TAC was marching and protesting

through the 2BY6 Campaign, Rath

accused TAC of receiving funding from pharmaceutical companies. TAC then engaged in
a legal battle with Rath for his slanderous accusations and also accused him of
experimenting on human subjects. Here, TAC utilized the Medicines Act to support its

Figure 7. Featured in the Mail & Guardian on Sept 21, 2005.

claim against Rath’s unlawful distribution of unregistered drugs and his experimentation
on humans. In 2006, the Court found that Rath had defamed TAC, which TAC
considered a victory against AIDS denialism, particularly since the ruling would enhance
TAC’s reputation at the grassroots level.
Although, TAC won the case against Rath it can not be counted as a positive
outcome unless it had implications in the social realm. In some sense there must have
been positive implications on public beliefs on the denialists approach as the Court revalidated TAC’s reputation. This would help TAC in its grassroots programs.
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TAC’s most influential and most prized program is Treatment Literacy. This
program is built and run by people at the local level to teach others in their community
about HIV science and treatment. This educational program trains locals to be Treatment
Literacy instructors who then reach out to people within the community. TAC highly
prioritizes education. In order to ensure health citizenship, the people must be educated
and knowledgeable.

Figure 8. Featured in the Mail & Gaurdian on 27 June 2005.

Stigma and Discrimination
In order to decrease stigma and discrimination, TAC created the

“HIV

POSITIVE” logo, printed on thousands and thousands of t-shirts which were worn at all
of TAC’s protests and marches. TAC created the logo so that onlookers could not
differentiate between who had HIV and who did not have HIV. The idea was that no one
can know if someone else has HIV, and therefore should not act in a discriminatory
manner towards them (personal conversation with Western Cape Provincial Coordinator,
Fredalene Booysen 2008). Also, it is an even more powerful visible statement when
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thousands of people congregate wearing HIV POSITIVE shirts on the streets of South
Africa to demand treatment access.
TAC also regularly publishes newsletters, the magazine Equal Treatment,
booklets and pamphlets to educate people about HIV/AIDS and related issues.
Understanding the complexity of the epidemic and how it affects so many parts of life in
addition to personal health, TAC adopts issues such as violence against women, and
xenophobia against refugees. TAC also implements door-to-door pamphlet campaigns
and “Cool Youth” HIV/AIDS education programs in local schools.
These efforts have helped to make HIV/AIDS a higher priority among South
Africans, as reflected by recent public opinion data. Results from the Afrobarometer polls
conducted between 1999 and 2004 suggest that HIV/AIDS has moved up the ladder of
what the public thinks the government should prioritize. This increase in prioritization
may be a reflection of people’s personal experience with the disease. From 2000 to 2004,
the percent of the South African population which had experienced personal loss due to
AIDS rose from 16 to 31 percent.
Overall, determining the social outcome is not as concrete as determining positive
political outcome, owing to the subjectivity of the matter and the lack of public opinion
data. Nonetheless, TAC has made significant strides even at the grassroots level. The
ability of TAC to mobilize thousands of people for protests and marches shows that its
actions at the social level are stirring people to support TAC’s goals. The growth of
TAC’s programs also shows that people at the grassroots level are willing to lend their
support and services. With some reservation, I would thus conclude that TAC has
achieved a positive social outcome.
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SUCCESS ACHIEVED?
TAC’s objective to attain treatment access for more South Africans was
successful. The numerous positive political outcomes show that TAC was able to press
the South African government to create policies and battle multinational pharmaceutical
companies for more affordable drugs. However, when it comes to the social outcomes,
determining success is less clear. TAC wanted to increase education on HIV/AIDS,
which it has done through its Treatment Literacy program. But whether stigma and
discrimination decreased can not be quantitatively stated.
My research on TAC’s activities and outcomes leads me to conclude that TAC
has been highly successful, particularly in its earlier years. But in the latter years, from
2004 to the present, the ambiguity of its goals makes it much more difficult to determine
if success was achieved after the initial political battles were won.

CLOSING REMARKS
TAC has certainly demonstrated a wide variety of tactics and strategies, targeting
all aspects of the multi-dimensional issues raised by the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the South
Africa. TAC has utilized its institutional structure and networks to affect not only the
policy aspect of the epidemic but also the social and grassroots service related aspects of
the epidemic. TAC’s well-roundedness helped to mobilize thousands and won
international acclaim and support.
Though many of TAC’s events and activities were covered in this paper, many
more were left out. Not being able to examine and include analysis of even more of
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TAC’s work may have limited the parameters for determining TAC’s success. Also, the
unavailability of public opinion data made it difficult to access the social outcome.
However, TAC’s unusual social movement approach may serve as a model for
other social movements. The complexity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic has required a wellrounded and comprehensive advocacy approach, which TAC developed. Though TAC
has achieved many legal victories, how these victories will translate into action at the
social level still remains to be discovered. Considering the range of the epidemic and the
thousands who still need treatment, TAC’s work is far from over. Hopefully, its success
in the early years will propel TAC to find more success in the future.
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APPENDIX A

TAC Income (1999-2008)
Fiscal Year
1999-2000
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08

Income
R 202,719
R 1,844,302
R 6,433,603
R 9,397,845
R 14,429,363
R 22,122,678
R 27,303,419
R 27,641,896
R 36,699,997

Expenditure
R 215, 981
R 1,351,434
R 3,734,709
R 10,814,913
R 13,567,776
R 19,340,525
R 29,824,479
R 29,138,367
R 37,268,958

(Deficit)/ Surplus
for the Year
R (13,262)
R 492,868
R 2,698,894
R (1,417,068)
R 861,587
R 2,782,153
R (2,521,060)
R (1,496,471)
R (568,961)

Source: TAC Audit Records available at http://www.tac.org.za/community/finance
Figures were converted using exchange rates from:
http://indexmundi.com/xrates/graph.aspx?c1=ZAR&c2=USD&days=3650&lastday=200
90326
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Timeline of the Treatment Action Campaign and other related events (1998 – 2008)
10 December 1998 – TAC launched on International Human Rights day in Cape Town,
with a small demonstration for the right to treatment.
21 March 1999 – Human Rights Day, South Africa. TAC holds first demonstrations of
people with HIV to demand a national PMTCT programme in three cities.
24 March 1999 – TAC holds its first meeting with ANC Minister of Health, Dr
Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, and issues statement on the need to reduce ARV drug prices.
Although the meeting was positive, soon after this relations between the TAC and the
government began to deteriorate.
1999 – Thabo Mbeki replaces Nelson Mandela as South Africa's second president. Dr
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang is appointed as Health Minister.
January 2000 – TAC files papers to join as amicus curiae on the side of the South African
(SA) Government in the litigation concerning the challenge to South Africa's Medicines
Act by international pharmaceutical companies (the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers'
Association – PMA).
5 March 2000 – TAC leads a march of 5,000 people to the Pretoria High Court on the
first day of the PMA court case.
19 April 2000 – The PMA withdraws its case against the SA Government under public
pressure and after TAC had been admitted to the case by the court.
July 2000 – TAC organizes global march for treatment at the start of the International
AIDS conference in Durban. The march is widely understood to have been a turning point
in acceptance of the right of access to treatment for people in Africa and other developing
countries.
March 2001 – TAC holds its First National Congress in Soweto attended by nearly 500
activists.
July 2001 – TAC launches Christopher Moraka Defiance Campaign to challenge the
patenting and pricing of the anti-fungal medicine, Fluconazole. The campaign is named
after a TAC member who died as a result of the unaffordability of Fluconazole.
21 August 2001 – TAC files legal papers against the SA Government regarding its failure
to provide ARVs to PMTCT.
October 2001 – The Bredell Consensus Statement on Access to ARV treatment is
launched by TAC and international scientists after a conference that brought activists and
scientists together.
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18 December 2001 – The Pretoria High Court rules in favour of TAC on PMTCT and
orders the government to roll out a programme on PMTCT. The government appeals the
order.
2 May 2002 – 5,000 TAC supporters march past the Constitutional Court on the day of its
hearing of the appeal in the PMTCT case.
5 July 2002 – South Africa's Constitutional Court hands down a landmark ruling in
favour of TAC and the right of access to healthcare services. One of the Constitutional
Court judge reports that he cried after the decision was made public.
September 2002 – TAC files a complaint with the Competition Commission concerning
the conduct and excessive pricing by multi-national pharmaceutical giants Boehringer
Ingelheim and GSK of three essential ARV medicines.
November/December 2002 – TAC involved in negotiations with business, labour, and
government to try to agree on a National Treatment Plan. The negotiations are sabotaged
by the government and ultimately unsuccessful.
February 2003 – TAC leads march of 20,000 to the South African Parliament on the day
of the Presidential state of the nation address to demand a national treatment programme.

TAC’s largest march of 20,000+ people on 14 February 2003.
21 March 2003 – TAC launches its civil disobedience campaign against the ANC
government to protest at the 600 deaths per day taking place as a result of HIV infection.
April 2003 – The civil disobedience campaign is suspended after hundreds of arrests and
an offer by the ANC to begin to talk to TAC again. TAC's suspension of its campaign is
made conditional on progress towards a National Treatment Plan.
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August 2003 – TAC holds its Second National Congress in Durban and decides to
relaunch civil disobedience.
9 August 2003 – The SA Government announces a cabinet decision to develop a national
ARV treatment plan. At this point, no people are officially receiving treatment in the
public health sector.
10 December 2003 – Out of court settlements are announced between TAC, GSK, and
Boehringer Ingelheim regarding TAC's complaint to the Competition Commission. The
companies agree to issue seven voluntary licenses for the drugs, increasing competition
and bringing down prices.
2 July 2004 – TAC turns its attention to broader issues around health systems and holds a
national conference to make demands for a ‘People's Health Service’.
November 2004 – Pretoria High Court rules in favour of TAC's right of access to
information and awards punitive damages against the Minister of Health (the Annex A
case) for withholding information about the implementation plan for ARV treatment.
September 2005 – TAC holds its Third National Congress. By this time less than 100,000
people are on treatment. TAC has 20,000 volunteers.
5 July 2006 – Judgments are handed down in favour of TAC in its case demanding access
to ARV treatment for prisoners at Westville prison in Durban, KwaZulu Natal.
August 2006 – TAC protests at the International AIDS Conference in Toronto lead to SA
Government muzzling the Minister of Health and seeking a new relationship with TAC.
27–28 October 2006 – TAC and its allies in the trade unions, churches, and NGOs hold a
national civil society congress on an HIV prevention and treatment plan. The Congress is
addressed by the Deputy President of South Africa.
1 December 2006, World AIDS Day – TAC and the government announce the creation of
a strengthened National AIDS Council (SANAC).
January – May 2007 – TAC closely involved in the drafting of an NSP on HIV/AIDS that
proposes to put two million people on treatment by 2011 and cut new HIV infections by
50 percent.
4 May 2007 – The NSP is endorsed by the Cabinet.
7 November 2007 – TAC files a new complaint with the Competition Commission, this
time against Merk Sharp and Dohme (MSD) over its refusal to license the ARV drug,
Efavirenz, on reasonable terms.
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9 November 2007 – TAC organizes mass demonstration to highlight the TB crisis in
South Africa.
March 2008 – TAC hold Fourth National Congress. By this time, 450,000 people are on
treatment in the public health sector. TAC debates new approaches to campaign for the
right to health.
1 June 2008 – TAC announces that MSD has agreed to license Efavirenz on reasonable
terms, leading to price reductions.
13 June 2008 – TAC wins its case against Matthias Rath, who is ordered by the Court to
stop unregistered ‘clinical trials’ and publishing advertisements claiming that vitamins
cure AIDS.
September 2008 – South African President Thabo Mbeki is removed as President of
South Africa by the ANC. South Africa's Health Minister is replaced in a Cabinet
reshuffle.
Source: (Heywood 2009, ) and (TAC Diary 2008)
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